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Although the vast majority of Americans have private health insurance, researchers focus almost exclusively
on public provision.  Data on the private insurance sector is extremely difficult to obtain because health
insurance contracts are complex, renegotiated annually, and not subject to reporting requirements.
This study makes use of a privately-gathered national database of insurance contracts agreed upon
by a sample of large, multisite employers between 1998 and 2005.  To gauge the competitiveness of
the group health insurance industry, I investigate whether health insurers charge higher premiums,
ceteris paribus, to more profitable firms.  I find they do, and this result is not driven by cross-sectional
differences across firms or plans: firms with positive profit shocks subsequently face higher premium
growth, even for the same healthplans.  Moreover, this relationship is strongest in geographic markets
served by a small number of insurance carriers.  Further analysis suggests profits act to increase employers'
switching costs, and insurers exploit this inelasticity where they have sufficient bargaining power.
 Given the rapid industry consolidation during the study period, these findings suggest healthcare insurers
possess and exercise market power in an increasing number of geographic markets.
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Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive? 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The U.S. stands virtually alone among leading industrialized nations in its heavy and 
increasing reliance on the private insurance sector to intermediate healthcare for its 
residents.
1  The assumption underlying this system is that fierce competition among private 
insurers yields more efficient outcomes, broadly writ (Enthoven 1978).  However, a 
comprehensive survey on the state of competition in healthcare appearing in the 1999 
Journal of Economic Perspectives concludes there is “little empirical evidence on 
competitive conduct by health insurance firms” (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson 1999).   A 2004 
report on the same by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice finds 
most experts believe the market is highly competitive (with the vocal exception of groups 
representing physicians), although new research on the subject is scarce and plagued by data 
and identification issues (see Scanlon et al. 2006 for a thorough review).
2  Meanwhile, 
continued faith in competitive markets is manifest in the rapid increase in outsourcing of 
public insurance to the private sector (Duggan 2004; Duggan and Scott Morton 2008), as 
well as lax antitrust enforcement during two decades of extensive insurer consolidation.  
Only three combinations have been challenged by the Department of Justice, and these only 
in select markets.
3   
 
This study evaluates whether and where local insurance markets are competitive by 
testing for evidence of conduct that can only occur in imperfectly competitive markets.  I 
                                                 
1 Other notable exceptions include the Netherlands and Switzerland.  Both countries require all individuals to 
purchase an approved healthplan from a private insurer.  
2 “Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition,” A Report by the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice (July 2004).   
3 These challenges were satisfied through consent decrees requiring divestiture in the markets with substantial 
overlap (Tucson and Boulder in the case of the UnitedHealth-PacifiCare merger in 2005; Houston and Dallas in 
the case of the Aetna-Prudential merger in 1999; and Las Vegas (Medicare Advantage plans only) in the case of 
the pending UnitedHealth-Sierra merger in 2008). Complaint, United States v. Aetna Inc., N0.3-99CV 1398-H, 
par. 19 and 20 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1999); Final Consent Order, United States v. Aetna Inc., No.3-99CV 1398-
H (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999); Complaint, United States v. UnitedHealth Group Incorporated & PacifiCare 
Health Systems, Inc., No. 1:05CV02436 (Dec. 19, 2005); Final Judgment,  United States v. UnitedHealth 
Group Incorporated & PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., No. 1:05CV02436 (May 23, 2006). Final Judgment, 
United States V. UnitedHealth Group Incorporated and Sierra Health Services, Inc. No. 1:08CV00322.   2
investigate whether firms with higher profits pay higher health insurance premiums, 
controlling as best as possible for differences in the plans selected, employee populations, 
and market conditions.   The extent to which carriers are able to extract employer-specific 
rents offers a glimpse into competitive interactions in this important sector, as a competitive 
industry would be characterized by uniform pricing at cost.  Although a “market conduct 
parameter” (i.e. a measure ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 representing perfect competition and 1 
monopoly) cannot be derived from estimates of rent extraction, differences in rent extraction 
across markets provide a useful indicator of the relative competitiveness of these markets.    
 
Using a proprietary panel database on fully-insured healthplans offered by a sample 
of large, multi-site employers between 1998 and 2005, I find firms with positive profit 
shocks subsequently face larger premium increases, even for the same healthplans.  
Moreover, this increase is greatest in markets with the fewest insurance carriers (particularly 
6 or fewer).  Thus, a multi-site firm with high profits in a given year will subsequently face 
significantly higher health insurance premiums, but only at sites served by a concentrated 
insurance market.  This result contradicts the leading alternative empirical explanation for 
my finding, namely that firms with high profits face higher premium increases because they 
increase benefits in dimensions I do not observe.  (If this is the explanation, it should occur 
uniformly across all sites.) 
 
To determine why insurance carriers are able to extract higher prices from profitable 
firms in concentrated insurance markets, I combine insights from field interviews with a 
model of bilateral bargaining, as large employers and insurers bargain annually over 
insurance contracts.  The evidence suggests employers are reluctant to switch healthplans 
during “good times,” i.e. profits increase willingness-to-pay for incumbent healthplans.   The 
fact that, conditional on the same profit shock, premiums increase the most in markets served 
by a concentrated insurance industry could be explained by a) larger profit-induced increases 
in switching costs in concentrated insurance markets  (i.e. there is more new rent to extract in 
these markets), b) greater bargaining (or market) power of insurers in these markets, or both.   
   3
Returning to the data, I find no support for a): conditional on the same profit shock, 
firms in markets with fewer insurance carriers are more likely to switch carriers, suggesting 
switching costs do not increase more for profitable employers in these markets.  Rather, it 
appears that the strong bargaining position of insurers in concentrated markets enables them 
to capture more of the extra surplus generated by profit shocks.  (Because prices are 
ultimately the result of bargaining between employers and carriers, I generally use the term 
“rent extraction” in place of “price discrimination,” which is typically reserved for settings in 
which the seller has commitment power , i.e., makes a single “take it or leave it” offer.  This 
technicality notwithstanding, the practice I investigate is akin to first-degree price 
discrimination, in which the seller sets individual prices to extract the surplus of each buyer.  
In the case of a monopoly supplier, consumer surplus is wholly extracted.
4  However, 
consumers retain some of the surplus in oligopoly settings (Spulber 1979; Armstrong 
2006).
5)   
 
The results offer the strongest evidence to date linking private health insurance 
premiums to the market power of insurers.  The data also indicate that an increasing share of 
the population is purchasing coverage in the least-competitive markets.  As of 2005, 23 
percent of employees in my sample (which is representative of Americans covered by large 
firms, who account for roughly one-third of the insured nonelderly) received coverage in 
markets with 6 or fewer major carriers (in which rent extraction is most pronounced), up 
from 7 percent in 1998.
6  Due to recent consolidations, this figure is certainly greater today.   
   
The findings complement recent work by Ho (2009) on the upstream bargaining 
between insurers and hospitals.  Ho finds insurers in some markets successfully extract the 
rents of hospitals in their networks, and hospitals in turn differentiate themselves to avert 
                                                 
4The term “price discrimination” is typically reserved for settings in which the seller has commitment power, 
i.e., makes a single “take it or leave it” offer.  For this reason, I use the term “rent extraction” in its stead, 
although the outcomes are the same. 
5 Spulber’s model assumes each firm faces a downward-sloping residual demand curve and has the ability to 
perfectly discriminate.  The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterized by marginal-cost pricing; social 
surplus is therefore maximized.  The residual demand curves become more elastic as competition increases, 
enabling consumers to capture an increasing share of surplus.   
6 The estimate of the number of insured nonelderly Americans covered by large firms (1000+ employees) was 
constructed by the author using estimates from the MEPS-IC (generously provided by Kosali Simon)  and the 
Employee Benefits Research Institute (http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10a-20061.pdf).   4
this.  Collectively, the results suggest uncompetitive insurance markets may render 
ineffective recent efforts to contain public insurance costs by outsourcing healthplans to the 
private sector.  Greater scrutiny of proposed consolidations in this sector may also be 
warranted, with particular attention to consolidations in markets with 6 or fewer major 
insurance carriers, and where switching costs of customers are high (e.g. if carriers are highly 
differentiated).   
 
The paper proceeds in six sections.  Section 2 provides background on the private health 
insurance industry and summarizes prior research.  Section 3 describes the data in detail.  
Section 4 presents the main empirical analysis of rent extraction, together with key 
robustness checks and extensions.  The model is described in Section 5, and analyses of 
healthplan switching are presented in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes.   5
 
2.  The U.S. Health Insurance Industry 
 
2.1   Key Facts 
 
Figure 1 graphs the percentage of nonelderly Americans covered by private insurance from 
1998-2005, separated by whether the coverage was employment-sponsored or individually-
purchased.  Coverage from both sources declined slightly during the study period, but 
remained high, with 70 percent of the nonelderly obtaining insurance through the private 
sector in 2005.  These figures understate the fraction of the nonelderly enrolled in private 
plans, as the majority of Medicaid beneficiaries are also enrolled in such plans (61 percent in 
2005).  Among the elderly, 95 percent are enrolled in Medicare, and nearly 13 percent of 
these received their care in 2005 through a private-sector Medicare Advantage plan.  An 
additional 59 percent of the elderly had private supplementary coverage in 2005.
7   
 
National statistics on private healthplans are available from the annual Employer 
Health Benefits survey, sponsored jointly by the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) and the 
Health Research and Educational Trust (HRET).
 8  This survey documents two key trends 
that are corroborated in my data.  The first is the rapid increase in health insurance premiums.  
Figure 2 illustrates these increases for 1998-2005, based on figures for a family of four.  
Annual growth peaked at 13.9 percent in 2003, declining to a still-impressive 9.3 percent in 
2005.  These figures likely understate the trend as employers have adjusted to rising costs by 
reducing the generosity of benefits provided.   
 
                                                 
7 Source: http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2036.pdf. These figures do not 
reflect Medicare Part D, the prescription drug program introduced in 2006.  Medicare Part D is administered 
entirely by the private sector and currently covers over 90 percent of Medicare beneficiaries.  Many providers 
are pharmacy benefit management firms rather than health insurance carriers. 
8 The KFF/HRET survey randomly selects public and private employers to obtain national data about employer-
sponsored health insurance; approximately 2000 employers respond each year.  The data are not publicly 
available, nor is the sample designed to provide estimates at the market level. (KFF/HRET Employer Health 
Benefits 2006 Summary of Findings, document 7528).  Since 1996, the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ), a division of the Department of Health and Human Services, has also conducted an annual 
survey of employers in conjunction with the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).  MEPS follows 
households over time, and the “Insurance Component” surveys employers of household members to gather data 
on healthplans.  The micro data are available on-site at Census Research Centers to those with appropriate 
clearance, but they do not constitute an employer-plan-level panel.  The most recent data available is for 2003.   6
The second trend is the growth in the share of employees covered by self-insured 
rather than fully-insured plans (Figure 3).  Many large employers choose to self-insure, 
outsourcing benefits management and/or claims administration but paying realized costs of 
care.  Such employers can spread risk across large pools of enrollees, and may purchase stop-
loss insurance to limit their remaining exposure. Per ERISA (the Employee Retirement Act 
of 1974), these plans are also exempt from state regulations and state insurance premium 
taxes.  According to the KFF/HRET survey, the share of large-firm employees enrolled in 
self-insured (as opposed to fully-insured) plans increased from 65 percent in 1998 to 82 
percent in 2005.  The increase among employees in all firms was much smaller: 50 to 54 
percent.
 9     According to Figure 2, premiums for fully-insured plans grew more quickly than 
average during this period.   
 
My primary study sample includes only fully-insured plans.   Reported “premiums” 
for self-insured plans are actually the employer’s estimate of outlays for the average enrollee 
in the plan-year.  These forecasts are used for budgeting purposes and to make decisions 
about enrollee contributions and stop-loss coverage.  They are not directly comparable to 
premiums for fully-insured plans, which are set prospectively and always include risk 
premiums.  Self-insured projections may include a partial risk premium if the employer 
purchases stop-loss coverage; whether stop-loss coverage is purchased is not captured in the 
data.  I make use of the self-insured sample, however, for a number of supplemental 
analyses.   
 
Premiums for fully-insured plans depend on the actuarial health risk of employees, 
details of plan design (e.g., copays, covered benefits, disease management programs), and 
general carrier characteristics (e.g., provider network, speed and accuracy of claims 
processing, reputation).  The employers represented in my sample typically solicit bids every 
year from one or more healthplans in all of the markets in which they operate.  Many use 
benefits consultants to serve as brokers in this process.  According to the brokers I 
interviewed, after some back-and-forth on plan details (e.g. copays, drug formularies, etc.), a 
                                                 
9 The rise in self-insurance, though beyond the scope of this paper, is an interesting subject for further research.  
Early work by Cooper and Simon (2007) reveals that firms are more likely to self-insure if they have multiple 
locations, a large number of workers, and high average wages.   7
“final round” of negotiation over the premium for a fixed plan design may take place.  The 
net result is that pricing of fully-insured healthplans is anything but transparent, rendering the 
setting ripe for differential pricing across employer groups, ceteris paribus.   
 
Contracts are signed 3 to 6 months prior to the start of the benefit year, which is 
generally the calendar year.  Thus, an employer will typically begin selecting 2009 plans and 
rates by early 2008.  To the extent that firm profits affect these agreements, the relevant 
profit figure will reflect data for 2007 (assuming data is available annually).
10   
 
2.2 Prior  Research 
 
A 2006 survey by Scanlon et al. finds 35 studies that investigate the impact of competition 
among health insurers on healthcare outcomes.  Of these, 7 use some measure of premiums 
as an outcome.  Most find a negative association between competition and premiums, but 
these studies suffer from serious data problems and identification issues.  For example, one 
of the most careful studies (Wholey et al. 1995) relies on annual HMO-level data from 1988-
1991.  Premiums are estimated using average revenue per member per month, and the degree 
of competition faced by each HMO is estimated as a weighted average of the HMO 
penetration rate (the percent of insured individuals enrolled in an HMO) in all of the counties 
in which the HMO operates.  PPOs are not considered, although in recent years courts have 
found HMOs and PPOs (as well as the variants in between) to be in the same product 
market.
11  Summarizing the shortcomings in this literature at large, Scanlon et al. emphasize 
a poor correspondence between measures of market competition and actual competitive 
conditions.  No studies address endogeneity of the concentration measures. 
 
Two recent studies describe the high and increasing level of concentration in local 
insurance markets.  Robinson (2004) uses a database of state regulatory filings to study state-
                                                 
10 Ginsburg et al. (2006) find evidence of a similar lag (18 months) between premiums reported by KFF/HRET 
and the cost of healthcare services (e.g., provider charges). 
11 The case law is summarized in “Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition,” ibid. Some cases in which 
separate markets for HMOs and PPOs have been rejected include Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic 
(65 F.3d 1406 (7
th Cir. 1995)) and Ball Memorial Hospital v. Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc.(784 F.2
nd 1325 (7
th Cir. 
1986)).   8
level market structure over 2000-2003.  By the end of his study period, nearly 40 states had a 
dominant carrier serving over one-third of the private market.  Robinson also documents 
increases in premium revenues and operating margins.  Of course, a causal link between 
concentration and premiums cannot be established through the coincidence of these trends.  
In addition, a commentary published alongside the piece states “an entire state is not a 
relevant geographic market, [hence] the existence of high HHIs in that state has no 
competitive (or probative significance)” (Hyman and Kovacic 2004).   Robinson (2006) 
documents still higher state-level concentration figures.  He also reports many insurers are 
targeting the public rather than the private sector for future growth. 
 
  The following section offers details on the high-quality, micro panel data that affords 
me the unique opportunity to examine the pricing of individual insurance contracts in the 
geographic markets actually utilized by insurers when negotiating rates.  Importantly, the 
identification strategy relies on shocks to individual employers rather than shocks to market 
concentration.  
 
3.  Data 
 
3.1 The LEHID Data 
 
The primary dataset was provided on a confidential, limited-use basis by a major benefits 
consulting firm.
12  The unit of observation is the plan-year.  A plan is defined as a unique 
combination of an employer, geographic market, insurance carrier, and plan “type” (HMO, 
POS, PPO, and indemnity), e.g., Worldwide Widgets’ CIGNA HMO in Phoenix, Arizona.  
The panel covers 1998-2005 (inclusive), and is unbalanced, with employers entering and 
exiting based on their relationship with the consulting firm, and specific healthplans 
appearing or disappearing when added or terminated, respectively.  Note that participation is 
                                                 
12Employers of all sizes rely on external consultants when designing or purchasing benefits. Using a 1997 
survey of 21,545 private employers, Marquis and Long (2000) find external consultants were employed by 
nearly half of the smallest firms (<25 workers), and nearly two-thirds of the largest firms (>500 workers).  
These findings suggest the firms engaging the services of my source are not unusual in this regard, 
strengthening the case for the generalizability of the results.    9
complete for any year in which an employer is included in the sample (i.e., all plans offered 
by that employer are present).
13  
 
The full dataset includes observations from 776 employers and 139 geographic 
markets in the United States.  The employers span a wide range of industries.  The top 3 are 
manufacturing and financial institutions (tied for 13 percent of employers each), and 
consumer products (9 percent of employers).   On average, 241 employers appear in the 
sample each year.  The median employer operates in 47 geographic markets and insures 
9,670 active employees (retirees are not included in the data).  The total number of 
employees represented in the sample averages 4.8 million per year.  This figure does not 
include dependents, so the number of insured individuals represented by the survey is at least 
twice as large.  
 
The geographic markets are defined by my source, and they represent the markets 
used by carriers and employers when negotiating rates.
14  The markets are sometimes defined 
by state boundaries (e.g., Delaware), but more commonly by metropolitan areas (e.g., Kansas 
City (in Missouri and Kansas); Kentucky – Louisville, Lexington; Kentucky – except 
Louisville, Lexington).  Figure 4 depicts the distribution of covered employees across the 
geographic markets.  This distribution closely matches the distribution of privately-insured 
employees in these markets (estimated using county-level data from the Current Population 
Survey of March 2000).  I will refer to the entire dataset by the acronym LEHID, for “Large 
Employer Health Insurance Dataset.” 
  
                                                 
13 Some data scrubbing was necessary to ensure that the same ID was assigned to the same employer in every 
year.  In the case of mergers, I create a new employer ID post-merger if both parties to the merger appear in the 
data separately in a prior year. 
14 Some carriers with a national presence will negotiate a single rate for all employees nationwide.  See footnote 
18 for a discussion of the implications of national pricing for the empirical analysis.   10
 
3.2 Study Sample 
 
The study sample is limited to fully-insured plans, for which premiums are determined prior 
to the start of the calendar year.
15  The shift toward self-insured plans, highlighted in the 
KFF-HRET survey, is also apparent in LEHID: the proportion of employees enrolled in self-
insured plans increased from 58 to 76 percent between 1998 and 2005.   However, the total 
number of employees in fully-insured plans is still sizeable, averaging 1.6 million per year.
16 
 
I restrict the study sample to observations in geographic markets containing 20 or 
more distinct employers; that is, 20+ employers must offer a fully-insured (FI) choice in that 
market-year.  This restriction is imposed to ensure accurate estimates of market structure, 
namely the total number of carriers serving a given geographic market.
17    Only 3 percent of 
the fully-insured employees in my sample are dropped as a result of this restriction.  Note 
this “LEHID-FI” sample is not the sample used for the regression analysis; that sample is 
further limited to plans for which profits of the associated employer can be obtained, and is 
described below. 
 
                                                 
15Self-insured plans report “premium equivalents,” their predictions of costs per enrollee.  These figures 
combine claim reimbursement, fees paid to carriers, and premiums for any stop-loss insurance.  
16There is a good deal of overlap in the carriers serving self-insured and fully-insured groups.  Among carriers 
serving more than 5 clients in LEHID, 57 percent have both fully-insured and self-insured plans, 41 percent 
have only fully-insured plans, and 2 percent have only self-insured plans.  The smaller carriers (<=5 clients) are 
more likely to be “pure plays,” with 11, 54, and 35 percent in these categories, respectively.  Figures are 
tabulated using the carrier-year as the unit of observation.   
17 Attempts to estimate the number of carriers from alternative sources were unsuccessful.  There are three 
potential sources of nationwide data for the study period: the Area Resource File, Interstudy (a private firm that 
compiles data on HMOs from state regulatory filings and various other sources), and web searches.  The Area 
Resource File reports the number of HMOs headquartered in each county, clearly a very poor estimate of the 
desired variable.  Interstudy provides information on the number and enrollment of HMOs by MSA.  However, 
the Interstudy data is prohibitively expensive, excludes PPOs (which clearly compete with HMOs) in most 
years covered by this study, and has been roundly criticized for the methods it uses to attribute enrollment to 
different geographic areas (Scanlon et al 2006).  Web searches also proved fruitless for several reasons. It is 
difficult to find time-series data for all markets, and to accurately capture the service area for each healthplan 
from the limited descriptions available online.  Some insurers identified in these searches only serve particular 
market segments (e.g. the individual market or the Medicaid market), and this analysis is concerned with the 
large, fully-insured group market.  Using the LEHID data itself (after applying the stringent 20+ criterion) 
should yield the most accurate estimate of the number of carriers serving the customer segment and geographic 
market of interest.   11
Figure 2 shows that premium growth in the LEHID-FI sample tracks the levels and 
trends published by KFF/HRET for FI plans fairly closely.  This bodes well for the 
generalizability of the data and results.  Figure 5 graphs the distribution of markets in the 
LEHID-FI sample by the number of carriers in the market.  Data are presented separately for 
1998, 2001, and 2005.  The fraction of markets with fewer than 6 carriers increased from 10 
to 35 percent over this period, while the fraction with more than 10 carriers decreased from 
35 to 7 percent.  The increase in concentration is also manifested in other measures such as 
the HHI and the 4-firm concentration ratio.  However, these measures are more prone to 
measurement error due to the size and non-random nature of the sample.  
  
The key independent variable for the analysis is the operating profit of employers.  To 
obtain profit data, I created a crosswalk file to match LEHID-FI employers to companies 
appearing in Compustat, a database of financial statistics.  The matches were identified by 
hand using company names, industry, locations, and number of employees.  Extensive web 
research was required to verify matches for some observations, especially in cases of 
subsidiaries, non-U.S. firms, and firms involved in mergers and acquisitions.  Profit is 
measured by the after-tax return on assets, defined as (earnings before extraordinary items + 
interest expense) / (gross assets  (including depreciation/amortization)).
18  Because 
Compustat is limited to large, publicly-traded firms, the LEHID FI-Compustat sample omits 
public-sector, nonprofit, and privately-held employers, as well as employers that do not 
appear in Compustat or lack data for the variables used to calculate operating profits.  Of the 
1678 employer-years in the LEHID FI sample, I am able to calculate lagged profit for 1151, 
or 69 percent of observations.   
  
To control for local economic conditions and healthcare utilization trends, I add data 
on the unemployment rate (reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) and the Average 
Adjusted Per Capita Cost for Medicare enrollees (abbreviated AAPCC and reported by the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services).  Both measures are available at the county-year 
                                                 
18 Compustat provides five alternative definitions of the after-tax return on gross assets.  This definition 
corresponds most closely to the measure of firm profitability used in “Disappearing dividends: changing firm 
characteristics or lowering propensity to pay?” (Fama and French 2001).  Results using the four other measures 
are extremely similar (see Online Appendix for details).   12
level, whereas LEHID markets are defined by my source using 3-digit zipcodes.  The 
correspondence is generally one-to-one in major metropolitan areas, where most LEHID 
employees are located.  For those counties belonging to more than one market code, I assign 
weights in proportion to the share of the population in each market code accounted for by the 
zipcodes within that county. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the LEHID FI-Compustat sample in each 
year.  The key variables include annual premium, enrollment, demographic factor, plan 
design, plan type, and lagged profit.
19  Annual premium combines employer and employee 
contributions, and is a per-employee average.  It reflects both the features of the plan selected 
(e.g., insurance carrier, benefit design, etc.) as well as the characteristics of the insured 
population (e.g., demographics and risk profile). 
 
Demographic factor is a summary measure that reflects family size, gender, and age.  
Plan design captures the generosity of benefits, including the level of copayments required of 
enrollees.  The exact formulae used to calculate these factors were not disclosed to me.  It is 
worth noting, however, that my source uses these factors to normalize and then compare 
premiums across plans and firms, and they are an industry leader in healthplan selection and 
design. The decline in plan design during the study period is also noteworthy, as it is 
consistent with reports that employers have reduced benefits in an effort to contain cost 
growth (so-called “benefit buybacks”). 
 
Four plan types are represented in the data.  Ordered by the restrictiveness of the 
provider network for each plan, these are: Indemnity (all providers covered), PPO (preferred 
providers fully covered, non-preferred providers covered in part), POS (“point of service” 
plan: care is “managed” as in an HMO, and if approval for a service is obtained preferred 
providers are covered in full and non-preferred providers in part), and HMO (care is 
managed and preferred providers are fully covered).  Approximately 90 percent of the plans 
in the LEHID FI-Compustat sample are HMOs.   
                                                 
19 Premiums are reported in nominal dollars.  All specifications use ln(premium) as the dependent variable and 
include year fixed effects, so nationwide deflators will not affect the coefficients of interest.   13
 
As discussed above, profit is lagged two years to reflect the timeline for plan 
selection.  Thus the 2001 recession is apparent in the summary statistics for 2003.  The 
recession had varying impacts across firms and sectors, as evidenced by the large increase in 
the standard deviation in 2003.  This is precisely the type of variation that identifies the effect 
of interest. 
 
The LEHID FI-Compustat sample includes an average of 144 employers and 102 
markets per year.   The decline in observations during the last two years reflects both the 
trend away from FI plans, and a general decline in the number of employers in the LEHID 
sample.
20  These trends are apparent in Appendix Table 1, which gives the number of 
employers included in LEHID in every year, together with the share with at least 1 FI plan 
and at least 1 SI plan.   
 
4  Do Profitable Firms Pay More For Health Insurance? 
 
4.1 Main Analysis 
 
My empirical strategy relies on the assumption that employers are willing to pay more for 
health insurance when profits are high (why is the subject of Sections 5 and 6).  If true, 
insurance carriers may exploit this circumstance by adjusting premiums accordingly.  The 
key regression relates plan premiums to lagged employer profits.  Recall a plan is an 
employer-geographic market- insurance carrier-plan type combination, denoted by the 
subscript emcj.  The first specification can be expressed as follows: 
 
emcjt t m t m emcj
em jt t j c   m e
emcjt t e emcjt
   X   
       
cs demographi margin   profit ) ln(premium       (1)
ε + φ + β + ρ +
ς + ω + δ + η + ψ + ν + ξ +
γ + γ + α = −
] [ ] [ ] [
2 2 , 1
 
 
                                                 
20The decline is heightened by the sample restriction that drops all observations in market-years with fewer than 
20 employers offering at least 1 fully-insured plan.  In section 6, I confirm the results are similar when this 
restriction is lifted.   14
Equation (1) includes fixed effects for each employer e, market m, carrier c, plan type j, and 
year t.  Employer fixed effects help to capture unobserved, time-invariant differences in the 
composition of the population covered, benefit design, and usage patterns for a given 
employer, all of which affect plan premiums.  Market fixed effects capture differences in 
medical costs (e.g., due to local wages) and practice.  There is a literature that documents 
substantial differences in medical practice and utilization (though, interestingly, not in 
outcomes) across geographic markets (e.g., Wennberg, Fisher, and Skinner (2002)).  Plan 
type fixed effects capture average price differences for these broad product groups, and 
carrier fixed effects capture average price differences across carriers due to time-invariant 
characteristics such as reputation.  Finally, year fixed effects absorb annual growth in 
premiums nationwide. 
 
  There are nine “second-order interactions” that could theoretically be included in this 
specification, however it is neither computationally feasible nor economically sensible to 
include them all in the baseline model.
 21  I rely on institutional knowledge to select two to 
include in all specifications: plan type-year effects ( jt ω ) and employer-market effects ( em ς ).  
(The remaining 7 will eventually be included in models discussed below.)  The plan type-
year effects absorb different premium growth patterns across plan types, such as the well-
known increase in HMO premiums associated with a loosening of HMO restrictions during 
this era of “managed care backlash.”  The employer-market interactions capture premium 
differentials associated with differences in the composition of employee populations and/or 
unobserved plan generosity across markets, e.g. headquarters vs. retail locations.  These 
interactions will also capture premium differentials associated with employers who are 
expanding versus contracting the number of markets in which they operate.  To the extent 
expanding employers are both more profitable and more generous with insurance benefits (in 
dimensions not captured by the covariates already in the model), the coefficient on profits 
could be upward-biased in the absence of these interactions.   
 
                                                 
21 Note employer-year fixed effects cannot be included, as this is the level of variation of the explanatory 
variable of interest.      15
Adding additional interaction terms to the model (whether second-order or greater) 
reduces the possibility of omitted variables bias but also eliminates potentially exogenous 
variation that can be used to identify γ1.  In recognition of this tradeoff, I present results for 
specifications with and without the bracketed terms in equation 1.  I begin by introducing 
fixed effects for each employer-market-plan type-carrier combination ( emcj ρ ).  Once these 
“plan fixed effects” are included, γ1 is identified by within-plan changes in premiums and 
changes in the profits of affiliated employers (due to the inclusion of employer fixed effects). 
 
The key advantage of including plan fixed effects is the elimination of cross-sectional 
variation as a source of identification for γ1.  For example, if firms experiencing positive 
profit shocks tend to choose generous benefit packages (within a given plan type and carrier), 
in the absence of plan fixed effects γ1 will reflect these omitted factors.  However, some of 
this cross-sectional variation may be desirable because competing plans act as a constraint on 
the pricing of incumbent providers.  Faced with an excessive price increase, some employers 
may switch plans to obtain better pricing.  Plan fixed effects eliminate any variation in price 
due to such switching.  Thus, the baseline model reveals whether employers facing profit 
shocks end up paying higher premiums on average (regardless of switching behavior),  while 
the models with plan fixed effects reveal whether these employers pay more for the same 
plans.  Note the plan fixed effects also subsume 5 of the remaining 7 second-order interaction 
terms.
22  The final two, market-year fixed effects and carrier-year fixed effects, are addressed 
below. 
 
I begin by adding market-year measures of economic conditions (the unemployment 
rate) and costs (the per-enrollee average Medicare expenditure, known as the AAPCC) to 
capture changes in economic conditions and healthcare trends that may be correlated with 
both employer profits and premiums.  These are denoted by  t m X .  If the coefficients of 
interest are sensitive to the inclusion of these covariates, market-year fixed effects (denoted 
t m φ ) are advisable.  Once included, γ1 is identified by differences in within-plan premium 
                                                 
22 The five interactions are: employer-carrier, employer-plantype, market-carrier, market-plantype, and carrier-
plantype. Plan fixed effects also subsume the employer-market fixed effects included in all specifications, so 
technically they capture 6 of the 9 possible second-order interaction terms.    16
growth for plans operating in the same market.  To clarify this source of identification, 
consider as a hypothetical example the Chicago-based healthplans offered by Boeing and 
United Airlines in 2003.  In the wake of September 11, 2001, United filed for bankruptcy 
while Boeing’s fortunes soared.  Controlling for the average premium growth in Chicago, as 
well as the average premium growth for specific plan types nationwide, I expect premium 
increases to be higher for Boeing if γ1 is positive.
23  Of course, a cost of including market-
year interactions is that variations in average firm profits in a given market cannot help to 
identify the coefficient of interest.  For example, many California-based firms benefited from 
the technology boom in 1999-2000.   The extent to which insurers were able to capture these 
rents will not be reflected in the estimates obtained from models with market-year fixed 
effects.  (On the other hand, neither would the effect of (hypothetically) faster-than-normal 
cost growth in California be mislabeled as “rent extraction.” Of course, the impact of the 
economic controls on the profit coefficient will reveal the likelihood of such a bias.)  For the 
sake of completeness, I also confirm the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of carrier-




Because premium rates for the same plan (i.e. emcj combination) are likely to be 
serially correlated over time, I perform a formal test as described in Wooldridge (2002).
25  I 
reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation with a p-value smaller than .001.  Given the 
unbalanced nature of the panel, I cannot implement a fully robust estimator (i.e. FGLS that 
allows for any heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms), however I can and 
do correct for AR(1) correlation in the errors using an FGLS estimator designed for this 
circumstance by Baltagi and Wu (1999).
26   
                                                 
23 Note this final model effectively includes all nine second-order interaction terms.   
24 Carrier-year interactions will be significant predictors of premiums if carrier-specific financial conditions 
impact premium increases.  However, excluding these interactions will only bias the coefficient of interest if 
employers with high or low profit shocks are disproportionately represented in the customer base of insurers 
experiencing systematically good or bad years.  Particularly after market-year interaction terms are included in 
the specification, such a scenario is difficult to envision.   
25 This test consists of running the first-differenced version of equations (1) or (2) and regressing the resulting 
residuals on their one-period lag.  A coefficient significantly different from -0.5 implies serial correlation. 
26 The Baltagi-Wu estimator is implemented by the stata command xtregar.   For models without plan fixed 
effects, the analogous command is xtpcse.  An alternative (though inefficient) approach is to use OLS and   17
 
Table 2 presents results for the 4 specifications represented by equation (1).  The 
estimates of γ1 are all positive, similar in magnitude, and statistically significant.  The point 
estimate increases upon inclusion of plan fixed effects, and is unaffected by the market-year 
covariates.  This suggests local economic conditions and/or changes in healthcare utilization 
are unlikely to be driving the results.  Controlling for differences in premium growth across 
markets (column 7) reduces the magnitude of  1 ˆ γ a bit, but this difference is not statistically 
significant.  Though not reported in the table, adding carrier-year interactions has virtually no 
impact on the coefficient estimates.  The results imply an employer with a 10-percentage 
point increase in profits can expect to pay approximately 0.3 percent more in health 
insurance premiums, ceteris paribus.   
 
  Next, I consider the possibility of bias due to changes in unobserved plan 
characteristics, such as provider networks, prescription drug formularies, and copayments.  
An alternative explanation for the positive estimate of γ1 is that firms with positive profit 
shocks respond by increasing benefits for workers, and more benefits come with a higher 
price tag.  As a first test of this hypothesis, I add plan design to each specification.  The 
results are reported in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 2, alongside the corresponding baseline 
specifications.  The coefficient on plan design is always positive and highly significant, 
suggesting it does capture the generosity of benefits.  However, the estimates of γ1 remain 
significant, and actually increase a bit (counter to the hypothesized direction of any omitted 
variables bias).  To the extent that other omitted, time-varying plan characteristics are 
correlated with this composite measure, this test provides some reassurance that these 
omitted factors are not generating the positive estimates of γ1.   
 
As a second test of this alternative explanation, I consider how the estimate of γ1 
varies by the market structure of the local insurance industry.   If γ1 reflects rent extraction by 
insurance carriers, it should be larger where competition is less fierce.  If instead it reflects 
the predilection of profitable employers to provide more generous benefits, it should be 
                                                                                                                                                       
cluster the standard errors by plan.  The point estimates are similar, but the standard errors tend to be larger (as 
expected).     18
insensitive to the market structure of the insurance industry: there is no obvious reason why 
multisite firms with high profits would increase benefits most in the sites served by a 
concentrated insurance sector.
27  I estimate models based on the following equation: 
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where NC stands for “number of carriers.”  I use 5 ranges for number of carriers: 1-4, 5-6, 7-
8, 9-10, and 11+.  (As indicated in Figure 5, these categories capture the distribution of 
number of carriers fairly well; unfortunately there is insufficient data to subdivide the 1-4 
category further.)  1(NC)mt is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the observation is 
from a market-year with NC carriers.  Thus, γ1,3 is estimated from observations in market-
years with 7-8 carriers.  Although an imperfect proxy for market competitiveness, the 
number of carriers is the most accurate measure of market structure available to me given the 
non-random nature of the sample.  (In the Online Appendix, I confirm the results are robust 
to replacing these categories with quintiles for HHI.)  Equation (2) also includes the number 
of carrier indicators to control for any market-wide effects of entry and exit on premiums. 
 
Table 3 illustrates that the magnitude of   NC , 1 ˆ γ  declines as the number of carriers 
increases.  T-tests reject the null hypothesis  5 , 1 1 , 1 ˆ ˆ γ = γ  in favor of  5 , 1 1 , 1 ˆ ˆ γ > γ in all 
specifications with p-values of .07 or less.  The relationship between profits and premiums in 
the most competitive markets is not significant in any of the specifications.  The point 
estimates are affected little by the addition of market-year covariates, indicating that 
differences in local economic and healthcare utilization trends are unlikely to be generating 
the observed sensitivity of premiums to profits in markets with few carriers.  The coefficient 
on markets with 5-6 carriers declines in the specification with market-year fixed effects, but 
                                                 
27 Similarly, profitable firms could respond to profit shocks by hiring more experienced employees who are 
older and costlier to insure.   19
otherwise the results remain similar even in this stringent specification, as well as in the 
unreported specification that adds carrier-year fixed effects.
28   
 
The estimates indicate that profitable firms pay more for their health insurance, 
ceteris paribus.  This effect is only significant in markets with 10 or fewer major carriers, 
and is most pronounced in markets with 6 or fewer carriers.   In such markets, a profit 
increase of 10 percentage points (roughly the standard deviation of profits during the 2001 
recession) is associated with an increase in health insurance premiums of 1.2 percent.
29   
 
The evidence that suppliers enjoy significant market power even when up to 10 
competitors are present is consistent with related research in industrial organization.  
Although a much smaller number of players is needed to achieve perfect competition in a 
homogenous product market (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991), the number in a differentiated 
product market can be a good deal larger.  Dranove, Gron and Mazzeo (2001) report 
evidence that the sixth HMO in an MSA earns supracompetitive profits, on average.   
(Estimates for entrants beyond the sixth are not reported.)  Once they categorize the HMOs 
by whether they have national networks, they find steeper declines in profits with additional 
entrants of the same type, although they do not report the maximal number of each type 
associated with positive profits.  Given the many dimensions along which insurance carriers 
are differentiated, the result that 10 or more are needed, on average, to inhibit customer-
specific rent extraction is in line with theoretical and empirical predictions. 
 
4.2 Alternative Explanations 
 
In this section, I consider alternative explanations for the key findings.  The first alternative 
explanation is that profitable firms increase the generosity of their plans more in more 
concentrated insurance markets.  To examine this possibility, I re-estimated the models above 
using plan design as the dependent variable.  Although changes in plan design itself will not 
                                                 
28 The coefficient estimates for the number of carrier indicators are available upon request.  These are identified 
by changes in the number of carriers within a given market over time due to entry, exit, and measurement error.  
The results are robust to the exclusion of the number of carriers indicators. 
29 I obtain this estimate using the average of the relevant coefficients in the specification with plan fixed effects 
and market-year covariates (column 3, Table 3): exp(((.145+.092)/2)*.1) =1.012.   20
impact the estimates I report because it is included as a control in the key specifications, to 
the extent plan design is correlated with unobservable generosity this analysis will shed light 
on the feasibility of this alternative explanation.  The results, reported in the Online 
Appendix as Tables OA1 and OA2, show that employers experiencing positive profit shocks 
do not tend to increase plan quality nationwide (rather, they decrease it), nor do they increase 
quality relatively more in more concentrated insurance markets.   
 
A second, related concern is that insurer markups for plan quality may be higher in 
more concentrated markets.  A higher markup for quality in concentrated markets could yield 
a similar pattern of results even if the increase in quality is the same across all markets. 
Moreover, to the extent that concentrated insurance markets coincide with concentrated 
healthcare provider markets, such a pattern of markups could reflect the exercise of market 
power by the latter (or perhaps some combination of the two).  Although the preceding 
analysis suggests profitable firms do not increase plan quality, to consider this alternative 
explanation directly I re-estimate the specifications represented by equation (2) with the 
addition of interactions between number of carrier categories and plan design.    The 
estimates are presented in Table 4.  The coefficients and standard errors on the interactions 
between market structure and lagged profits are virtually unchanged.  In addition, there is 
little evidence that the markup for plan quality is higher in more concentrated markets.  The 
point estimates are only larger for more concentrated markets in one of the four 
specifications (the model without plan fixed effects), and even in this specification the 
difference between the coefficient on plan design for the most and least concentrated markets 
is not statistically distinguishable from zero.   
 
The preceding analysis raises the question: are there other factors correlated with 
insurer concentration that could be producing the observed pattern of findings?  Table OA3 
in the Online Appendix presents descriptive statistics for the market-years in each category.  
The table shows that the most concentrated markets have smaller populations, lower income 
per capita, and are less urban than the least concentrated markets.  However, it is important to 
recognize that the analysis of rent extraction does not examine the relationship between 
market structure and premium levels, which could certainly be affected by these other   21
characteristics.  Rather, the study investigates how individual insurance contracts are revised 
to reflect changes in individual customer characteristics.  It is difficult to conceive of a 
mechanism whereby differences in the underlying attractiveness of a market – or in any other 
market-specific characteristics - could generate the observed behavior.  For example, one 
unobserved market characteristic is provider concentration.  Even if provider concentration is 
correlated with insurer concentration, the former cannot price-discriminate across specific 
employers when insurers serve as intermediaries.  Finally, the impact of any differences 
across market-years in demographics or provider concentration are controlled for in 
specifications with market-year fixed effects.   
 
4.3 Robustness and Extensions 
 
I performed several robustness checks and additional analyses to corroborate and extend the 
key results.  First, I used the first-differences (FD) estimator in place of the FGLS estimator 
for models that include plan fixed effects.  Although the FD estimator is inefficient due to the 
serial correlation in the error terms, it should be unbiased.
 30   I reorganized the data into first-






This specification corresponds to specification (1) after plan design and plan fixed effects are 
included (i.e., Table 2, columns 4 and 8).  I also estimated analogous models with the number 
of carrier dummies*profit margin interactions.  The results, presented in Table 5, are fairly 
similar to the FGLS results.  Although the coefficient estimates are smaller, the key 
coefficients remain statistically significant at p<.01.
31 
                                                 
30 Two additional advantage of the FGLS estimator are: (1) it enables comparisons of estimates with and 
without plan fixed effects; (2) it retains more data points given the unbalanced nature of the panel. 
31 I also used the first-differenced data to see whether the rent extraction parameter differs for employers 
experiencing positive vs. negative profit shocks.  I added the term 
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  Next, I performed a falsification exercise using data on self-insured (SI) plans.
32  
Because reported “premiums” for self-insured include expected fees charged by the carriers 
who administer these plans, evidence of rent extraction may be apparent in the data.  
However, the relationship should be weaker than that observed in the fully-insured market, as 
error in the dependent variable is substantial (because projections are imperfect measures of 
realized costs), there are more competitors in the self-insured market, and fee structures for 
administrative services are far more transparent than pricing for fully-insured plans.
33 
 
Using the sample of self-insured plans in the same market-years included in the 
analysis of fully-insured plans, I estimate models (1) and (2) from section 4.1 (i.e., the levels 
specifications).  The dependent variable is the log of the employer’s estimate of outlays for 
each plan-year (ln(“premium”).  The indicators for number of carriers still refer to FI carriers. 
Using the FI market structure is the likeliest way to reveal whether the main results are 
spurious.  In addition, the self-insured market is less concentrated, precluding identification 
of  NC , 1 γ  in markets with small numbers of SI carriers.  The results show a negative 
relationship between lagged profits and estimated outlays.  Decomposing the relationship by 
market structure reveals no steady pattern.  To the extent the projected costs of SI plans are 
an appropriate counterfactual for FI plans, these findings suggest the main results are not 
spurious. 
 
Most employers in the sample offer one or more self-insured plans alongside their 
fully-insured choice(s).  The substitutability of self and full insurance raises two interesting 
extensions:  First, are firms likelier to self-insure in the wake of profit shocks due to the 
higher premiums they face for full insurance? Second, do they end up paying more on 
average (across all plans) following profit shocks, and is this increase smaller in markets with 
more FI carriers?  To answer these questions, I use data on all plans offered by employers in 
                                                                                                                                                       
indicator for a positive profit shock. The results were inconclusive, i.e. I am unable to reject the null of 
symmetric rent extraction parameters.  
32 I thank Mark Pauly for this suggestion. 
33More transparent pricing should limit the ability of insurers to price-discriminate.  Although contract structure 
varies, it typically specifies fees per enrollee and/or per claim.)    23
the LEHID-FI-Compustat sample, regardless of whether an FI plan is offered in a particular 
year.  I aggregate the data to the employer-market-year level and estimate models using both 
percent self-insured and ln(average “premium”) as dependent variables, where “premium” 
reflects both full-insurance premiums and expected outlays for self-insured enrollees.   
 
A detailed discussion of the data, together with descriptive statistics and tables of 
results are given in Appendix A.  I find no evidence that employers are more likely to rely on 
self-insured plans in the wake of profit shocks.  In concentrated insurance markets, average 
“premiums” rise with profit shocks, even when incorporating possible substitution toward 
self-insured plans.   
 
There are several possible reasons profitable employers are not more likely to switch 
toward self-insurance in spite of the price increases they face relative to less profitable 
employers.  The timeframe for making a decision to switch to self-insurance may be lengthy.  
The right vendors must be identified and contracts written.  Self-insured firms must maintain 
adequate financial reserves to pay claims as they are realized, and they must bear the risk of 
unpredictable medical expenses.  Perhaps most important: profitable firms may be reluctant 
to make any major changes to their plan portfolios for reasons I describe in section 5. 
 
  Another important robustness check concerns the implicit assumption that premiums 
for each plan-year are set independently.  Multisite firms negotiating with multimarket 
insurers may agree to premiums for many sites at once.  To the extent this occurs in my 
sample, the estimates I obtain in Table 3 are conservative because price changes for these 
firms will not vary with the concentration of local insurance markets.   Unfortunately, there is 
no direct indicator of multisite contracts in the data.
34  I therefore pursue a conservative 
approach to identifying jointly-negotiated contracts.  I identify employer-carrier-plantype 
combinations that are the same across multiple markets, and assume any that share the exact 
same value for plan design (a continuous measure) are jointly-negotiated.  Then, I include 
                                                 
34 Regrettably, the premium variable cannot be used to infer which plans are part of such a contract.  I observe 
the average premium per plan-year.  Even if Company X’s Aetna HMO charges the same premium, by family 
size, across all markets, the average premium will take on different values across these markets due to 
differences in average family size at each site.   24
only one observation for this set of plans in the estimation sample.
35  As expected, the results 
(reported in the Online Appendix as Tables OA4 and OA5) are generally stronger, although 
the sample size falls by nearly one-half and the standard errors increase accordingly. 
 
The Online Appendix also includes tables of results from several additional analyses.  
I evaluate the impacts of each of the following changes in turn: (1) weighting each 
observation by the number of enrollees; (2)  dropping data from 2004 and 2005, the years in 
which the number of markets in the sample declines substantially due to the restriction that 
20+ employers be sampled in each market-year;  (3) expanding the estimation sample to 
include all market-years (not just those with 20+ employers); (4) restricting the sample to 
HMOs only, which account for more than 90 percent of fully-insured plans; (5) using 
alternative profit measures; (6) using quintiles of the HHI as a measure of market 
concentration (rather than the number of carriers); (7) using different approaches to counting 
the number of carriers.   All key patterns remain statistically significant, and are often 
stronger, when any of these changes is implemented. 
 
 
5   Interpreting the Results: Combining Practitioner Intuition and Bargaining Theory 
   
5.1 Practitioner Intuition 
 
The results of the prior section imply that firms are willing to pay more for health insurance 
when times are good, and in concentrated insurance markets carriers successfully extract 
some (or all) of this increased willingness-to-pay.  This begs the question of why firms fail to 
minimize costs regardless of profit level.  Although cost minimization is a key assumption of 
neoclassical economics, the business press is replete with anecdotal evidence of profligate 
spending during booms and inefficient cost-cutting during busts.  These inefficiencies 
 have 
                                                 
35For example, suppose Company X offers a BCBS PPO in 30 markets.  If plan design– a continuous measure 
that captures the generosity of copays and coverage – is the same across these markets, I include only 1 of these 
plans in the estimation sample.  If it is the same across 10 of the markets, then I include 1 of these 10 plans and 
all of the remaining 20 plans in the sample.    25
also been corroborated in research by Borenstein and Farrell (2007).
 36 Borenstein and Farrell 
find stock market valuations of gold mining firms are concave in the price of gold.  Given the 
perfectly competitive output market, this result is consistent with a decrease in cost efficiency 
when profits are high.   
 
  A potential source of cost inefficiencies in “fat firms” is rent-sharing with workers, or 
to be more precise, rent-sharing that is not part of an optimal labor contract.
37  Borenstein and 
Farrell do not find evidence of rent-sharing in the mining sector, but it has been documented 
in a number of industries and countries (e.g., Dickens and Katz 1987, Katz and Summers 
1989, and Blanchflower et al. 1996).  Although empirical evidence of rent-sharing focuses on 
wages, the relationship with fringe benefits such as health insurance may be similar, as there 
is some evidence that benefits and wages are interchangeable (e.g., Gruber 1994 and Pauly 
1998).  When presented with my findings, industry experts suggested precisely such an 
explanation.
38    
 
The argument proffered by the experts is linked to the high switching costs 
employees must incur when changing healthplans. These costs include: learning about 
changes in benefit coverage and design and potentially adjusting healthcare consumption as a 
result; identifying providers that belong to the new plan’s network; if former providers are 
not part of the network, scheduling and undergoing new patient visits (which may lead to a 
disruption in care and associated medical consequences), transferring medical records and 
prescriptions, and, for plans with “gatekeepers” (such as HMOs or POS plans) navigating 
through a gatekeeper in order to see specialists; figuring out the claims reimbursement 
system.  For employers to obtain the best pricing on plans, they must be willing to change 
carriers.  However, a plan switch is a “tough sell” in good times, to paraphrase an executive 
                                                 
36 Writing in BusinessWeek in March 2008, former General Motors head Jack Welch and co-columnist Suzy 
Welch advise firms to “trim the fat” to cope with the economic slump.  “Years of sustained growth practically 
guarantee some padding,” they note, citing as examples excessive overhead, non-essential consulting projects, 
and “the quality of company gatherings.” (3/3/2008, p. 88).  
37 Rent-sharing may of course be optimal, particularly if workers and firms are risk-averse (Blanchflower 1996) 
or if specific investments are required for both parties. 
38 This explanation was proposed by an executive from my data source, and subsequently corroborated in 
interviews with a large insurance broker/former insurance executive (phone interviews, 10/9/2007 and 
10/10/2007), and a CFO at a leading health insurer (phone interview, 10/25/2007).  All sources requested 
anonymity.   26
from my data source.  Workers are willing to tolerate such actions (along with, say, the 
holiday party in the office conference room), but only when viewed as necessary.  Thus 
profitable firms may share rents with workers by retaining existing plans.   
 
While this hypothesis may explain why insurers can extract higher rents from more 
profitable firms on average, it does not explain why this extraction is more successful in 
markets where fewer insurers compete.  To obtain some intuition for this result, I formulate a 
simple bargaining model that captures the key elements of this setting. 
 
5.2  A Bargaining Model 
 
Assume each employer e purchases insurance from only one insurer i, both parties have full 
information, and the transaction price is determined through Nash bargaining.  (A more 
realistic model would accommodate the possibility of multiple contracts, as well as 
asymmetric information on both sides, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.)   Denote 
the employer’s value of purchasing insurance from i (that is, the employer’s willingness-to-
pay) by
ie v .  
ie v  is a function of employee demographics and risk profiles  e X , employer 
profits  e π ,  insurer characteristics  i X , plan design q, and an additive i.i.d. error term uie  that 
represents idiosyncratic variation in the employer’s valuation of its healthplan in a given year 
(e.g. due to the preferences of a new benefits manager, or bad publicity surrounding a 
particular insurer).    
 
(5.21)  () [] ie i e e ie u q X X g v + π = , , , 
 
The employer’s value of the next-best option ( ) ie v−  is similarly constructed, however I 
replace  i X −  with N, the number of insurers.  N is arguably a reasonable proxy for the 
attractiveness of the next-best option, as more choices should increase the likelihood of a 
good match.  The cost of insuring e is assumed constant across insurers (this assumption is 
not necessary for the results that follow and is imposed in the interest of parsimony).   
         27
The surplus from trade between e and i, denoted Sie, can be written 
 
(5.22)  [] () [] ( ) [ ] ie e e ie i e e ie ie ie u q N X h u q X X g v v S − − + π − + π = − = , , , , , ,.  
 
Under the assumption of perfect information, trade will take place when surplus is positive.  
The division of surplus is determined by 0 ≤ α(N) ≤1; this parameter reflects the insurer’s 
bargaining power.  Denoting the amount of surplus going to the insurer by P (for price or 
premium), we have 
 
(5.23)  () ( ) ie ie i e e ie ie u u N q X X S N P − π α = , , , , , , *.  
 
In words, premium is determined by relative bargaining power, employee demographics and 
risk profiles, employer profits, the employer’s choice of plan quality, and the extent of 
competition in the marketplace.
39  Most of the regression specifications focus on changes in 
premiums for the same ie pair.  Thus, identification in these models derives from changes in 
demographics, profits, and plan quality, all interacted with bargaining power (which itself 
may vary if there is entry and exit).
40 
 
I use this model to derive the implications of a change to employer profits.  There are 
two readily-available outcomes to consider: price and the probability of trade.  It is easy to 
see that premiums for observed contracts only increase in profits, i.e.  0 / > π ∂ ∂ e ie P  (the 
empirical result of section 3), if  e e h g π ∂ ∂ > π ∂ ∂ / / .  In light of the results presented thus far, 
this condition implies profits increase the employer’s relative value of remaining with an 
incumbent.  This could be evidence of inefficient cost-minimization practices (i.e. inertia) 
associated with profits (a la Borenstein and Farrell’s "fat firms"), or of a profit-induced shock 
to switching costs (as suggested by the industry experts).  In either case, these relative 
                                                 
39 It would be more straightforward to include terms for insurer characteristics in the model, but using the 
number of competitors proves far more convenient when deriving the results. 
40 Although the empirical models do not explicitly include interactions between demographics and market 
structure, the results are robust to these terms.   28
changes in willingness-to-pay will not result in higher premiums unless insurers have 
positive bargaining power,  0   i.e. > α . 
 
  Next, consider the effect of a profit shock on the probability that an employer and an 
insurer who traded in a prior period (i.e. the incumbent insurer-employer combination, for 
which Sie was positive) part ways.  Denoting the cumulative probability distribution of 
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Given a probability density function is weakly positive everywhere, and the empirical results 
indicate the second term is negative, we have the first additional empirical prediction: the 
probability that an employer and an insurer part ways should decline in profits. 
 
Next, consider how these predictions vary by the number of insurers in the market, 
beginning with price : 
 
(5.26)  () ( ) N h h g N N P e e e e ∂ π ∂ ∂ α − π ∂ ∂ − π ∂ ∂ ∂ α ∂ = ∂ π ∂ ∂ / * / / * / /
2 2  
 
From the empirical results, we know  0 /
2 < ∂ π ∂ ∂ N P e and ( ) 0 / / > π ∂ ∂ − π ∂ ∂ e e h g .  Thus, 
either insurer bargaining power declines in the number of insurers ( 0 / < ∂ α ∂ N ), the effect of 
profit shocks on the value of the employer’s outside option increases in the number of   29
insurers ( 0 /
2 > ∂ π ∂ ∂ N h e ), or both.
41   If  N h e∂ π ∂ ∂ /
2 can be shown to be negative, then we 
can definitively conclude that insurer bargaining power declines in the number of insurers. 
 
  Unfortunately, I do not directly observe each employer’s best outside option.  
However, I obtain some additional insight by examining how the number of insurers affects 
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This cross-partial can be signed empirically by seeing how the rate of match dissolution with 
respect to profits varies with N.  This is the second empirical test I perform in the next 
section.  Although the second of the two terms on the right-hand-side is of indeterminate sign 
because f’() cannot be signed, an empirical finding that  ( ) 0 /
2 < ∂ π ∂ ∂ N F e  is consistent with 
0 /
2 < ∂ π ∂ ∂ N h e .  That is, if profitable firms are less likely to switch carriers in more 
competitive insurance markets, this suggests that the effect of profits on the outside option 
decreases in N.  Returning to (5.26),  this strengthens the case for  0 / < ∂ α ∂ N . 
 
  To summarize, the model provides the following insights: (1) the rent-extraction 
result of section 3 appears to be due to a combination of insurer bargaining power (i.e. α > 0) 
and employer inertia or switching costs; (2) employers with profit shocks should be less 
likely to switch carriers; (3) the fact that rent extraction is weaker in markets with more 
insurers is consistent with two explanations: lower insurer bargaining power  in such 
markets, and/or less of an increase in profit-induced inertia or switching costs in these 
markets; (4) if employers with profit shocks are less likely to switch in markets with large 
numbers of carriers, the second explanation is less likely to be driving the results. 
                                                 
41 Technically, of course, other combinations are possible, but not intuitive.   30
 
6  The Relationship between Plan Switching and Employer Profits 
 
This section tests the predictions regarding the propensity of firms to switch healthplans.  I 
begin by investigating whether switching is less likely when firms are profitable, controlling 
for other factors that may be associated with the propensity to switch.  To analyze switching 
behavior, I create a dataset of employer-market-year observations and estimate linear 
probability models of the following form: 
 
. ] [ ] [ ] [ 2 ) 1 , ( emt em e t m t t t t em                  margin   profit h      switc (4) ε + ς + ξ + φ + τ + ϕ + α = − −  
 
I define two versions of switch: carrierswitch and planswitch.  carrierswitch takes a value of 
1 if there is an addition or deletion of insurance carriers by an employer in a given market 
between t-1 and t.  Planswitch takes a value of 1 if there is an addition or deletion of carrier-
plantypes.  Planswitch will overstate switching, e.g., if a firm switches from a 
UnitedHealthcare HMO to a UnitedHealthcare POS, it will be coded as having made a switch 
when no material switch has occurred.  carrierswitch will understate switching, e.g., if a firm 
offers an Aetna HMO, Aetna PPO, and UnitedHealthcare PPO, and eliminates the Aetna 
PPO, it will not be coded as having made a switch.  For this reason, I present estimates using 
both measures.
42   
 
  The baseline model captures the association between lagged profits and the 
propensity to switch, controlling for national trends.  The next specification adds market-year 
interactions to control for general upheaval in a market-year due, for example, to mergers or 
exits of insurance carriers.   Absent these interactions, the estimate of φ will reflect such 
activity if it is correlated with market-level changes in lagged profits of employers.  
Employer fixed effects are added next; these control for any employer-specific tendencies to 
switch, which may also be correlated with profit levels and hence bias the estimate of φ.  For 
                                                 
42 To reduce measurement error, the switch variables are defined only when data from two adjacent years is 
available.  Unfortunately, error due to mergers, acquisitions, and divestments of insurers and employers cannot 
be purged from these variables.  Market-year fixed effects will, however, control for such changes in the local 
insurance market.    31
example, employers in sectors with high labor turnover may switch healthplans more often 
because their employees are less likely to have a continuous relationship with a healthplan 
and/or its associated providers.  If such employers also tend to report lower profits, the 
estimate of φ could be biased downward in the absence of employer fixed effects.  Note also 
that after employer fixed effects are included, φ is identified by within-employer changes in 
profits.  Last, I add employer-market fixed effects, which allow for different baseline 
switching levels across employer-markets.  For example, employees of a large retail chain 
may differ across locations, with headquarters employees expecting steady benefits and retail 
clerks in all other markets willing to tolerate switches more readily. 
 
  I estimate the switching specifications on the entire sample of employer-market-year 
observations with Compustat data, and on the subset of observations with at least one fully-
insured plan and located in markets with 20+ employers offering a fully-insured choice.   
There is no theoretical reason to restrict the switching analysis in this way; I present results 
using this subsample to maintain consistency with the rent extraction analysis.  The 
descriptive statistics for the switching variables in both samples are given separately by year 
in Table 7; 1998 is omitted as the switching variables can only be defined for employer-
markets with data in the preceding year.  Just over one-third of the observations in the total 
sample have a carrier switch, and 45 percent have a plan switch.  The figures are even higher 
in the fully-insured sample, with 47 percent of observations switching carriers and 56 percent 
switching plans.  In both samples, there is a marked decline in switching over time.  This 
reflects, at least in part, the declining number of options available.   
 
The results of the switching analysis (Table 8) strongly support the hypothesis that 
more profitable firms are less likely to switch carriers or plans.  The point estimates are 
slightly larger for carrierswitch, and given the lower mean levels of carrierswitch this 
translates into larger proportional effects.  For example, a 10-percentage-point increase in 
profit margins in year t is associated with a reduction of roughly 4 percentage points in the 
propensity to switch carriers between t+1 and t+2.  Given the mean levels of carrierswitch, 
this corresponds to a decline of more than 10 percent.  The planswitch models yield   32
somewhat smaller estimates, but both results are quite robust to alternative specifications as 
well as the different data samples.   
 
The advantage of the linear probability models is the ability to control for a variety of 
fixed effects.  However, a binary outcome measure does not permit a distinction among types 
of switching.  Plan deletion should be much more responsive to profits than plan addition, 
which should not generally impose a cost on employees (apart from those responsible for 
benefits administration).   To refine the analysis, I therefore estimate multinomial logit 
models using two multivalued outcome measures, carrierchange and planchange, which 
correspond directly to carrierswitch and planswitch.  The outcomes are no change (the base 
outcome), add only, drop only, and add and drop.   To the extent profitable firms avoid 
carrier and/or plan changes in general all three outcomes will be less likely for such firms.  
However, if the mechanism described above is correct, changes that include deletions should 
be the most sensitive to profits.   
 
In these models, I include only lagged profits and year fixed effects as explanatory 
variables.   Estimating coefficients for additional fixed effects is neither computationally 
feasible nor conceptually appropriate given the data.  An employer fixed effect, for example, 
would control for the propensity for every employer to select every outcome, leaving only 
within-employer, within-outcome variation to identify the parameters for each choice.   
Given the switching results presented in Table 8 are generally insensitive to the inclusion of 
various fixed effects, the pattern of coefficients and predicted outcomes for a parsimonious 
multinomial model should yield accurate qualitative conclusions. 
 
Table 9 reports the results in the form of risk ratios for each outcome relative to the 
base outcome of no change, using carrierchange in the top panel and planchange in the 
bottom panel.  Both models are estimated on the combined SI and FI sample (results are 
similar with the FI sample, and available upon request.)  All of the ratios are significantly 
less than 1, indicating that more profitable firms are less likely to make any changes to their 
carriers or plans.  However, the relative risk ratio for adding is four to five times as great as 
that for deleting or adding and deleting, which are fairly close in size; this difference is also   33
statistically significant. To put the results into the context of outcome probabilities, at the 
bottom of each panel I present the realized probabilities together with the mean of predicted 
probabilities assuming a profit shock of .10 for each employer.  Using the results from the 
carrierchange model, the probability of adding a plan declines from .090 to .085 (6%), the 
probability of deleting a plan declines from .105 to .083 (21%), and the probability of adding 
and deleting a plan declines from .160 to .133 (17%).  These results suggest employers are 
especially reluctant to drop healthplans when profitable, a finding that supports the 
hypothesis that profits act to raise employers’ switching costs. 
 
Next, I turn to the question of how the propensity of profitable firms to switch 
healthplans varies by the market structure of the local insurance industry.  Conditional on the 
same positive profit shock, if firms in markets with a greater number of insurers are more 
likely to switch, the shock to switching costs may be lower in these markets.  Under this 
scenario, the fact that insurers extract less of the profit shock in such markets may be 
attributable to a smaller effect of the profit shock on switching costs in these markets.  The 
results in Table 9 suggest the exact opposite: firms in more competitive markets are less 
likely to switch carriers in the wake of a profit shock.
43  (Results are presented for linear 
probability models using carrierswitch as the dependent variable and estimated using the 
entire sample; results for other samples, dependent variables, and models are similar.)  As 
demonstrated by the model, this result suggests that higher bargaining power of insurers is 
the likelier source of greater rent extraction in markets with small numbers of carriers.  The 
result is also consistent with the rent-extraction finding: profitable firms face the greatest 
premium increases in concentrated insurance markets, and are likeliest (ceteris paribus) to 
shop around in these markets.   
 
The Online Appendix presents the results of an additional analysis examining the 
benefits to employers of switching.  If switching costs are the main reason profitable 
employers are willing to pay more for health insurance, then among the set of employers who 
do switch profit shocks should not be associated with higher premiums, ceteris paribus.  The 
                                                 
43 In all specifications presented Table 8, two-sided t-tests easily reject equality of the coefficients on lagged 
profits*(1-4 carriers) and lagged profits*(>10 carriers).   34
analysis is consistent with this hypothesis: new plans are cheaper than old plans, and among 




8   Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The U.S. healthcare system relies heavily on private insurance companies to manage 
healthcare consumption and payments to providers.  Private insurers’ share of health 
expenditures in the U.S. stood at 35% in 2000, more than twice that of the next-highest share 
(15% in The Netherlands).
45  In 2007, expenditures by private insurers were estimated at 
$676 billion, up from $295 billion in 1993.
46   
 
Although advocates of the private insurance system usually appeal to the virtues of 
competition, to date there is little empirical evidence to support the assumption of robust 
competition among insurance carriers.
47  Prior studies are limited by poor data quality, 
inaccurate measures of competition (typically limited to a broad measure of HMO activity), a 
lack of exogenous variation in these measures, and inappropriate market definitions.   
 
With the benefit of high-quality micro panel data on a large sample of fully-insured 
group healthplans, I find insurers have sufficient market power to negotiate higher premiums 
disproportionately for firms experiencing positive profit shocks.   This result stands in stark 
contrast to that predicted in the competitive setting, where private insurers vying for each 
contract bid down the premium until it has no relation to the employer’s willingness to pay.  
                                                 
44 It is important to note that the switching decision cannot be assumed exogenous to the new premiums.  That 
is, employers who switch probably do so in order to get attractive deals.  The results of this supplemental 
analysis suggest profitable employers may insist on particularly attractive deals in order to switch. 
45 OECD Health Data, 2003, 2
nd edition. 
46 Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group.  
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2007.pdf.  These figures do not include 
estimates of insurer profits and costs, i.e., they do not represent total premiums collected.  Data on total 
premiums is not readily available. 
47 As insurer consolidation continues apace, concerns are mounting.  For example, in 2006 the Kaiser Family 
Foundation’s Annual Survey of Employer Health Benefits asked employers to rate the role of “higher insurance 
company profits” in contributing to health insurance premiums; this is the first time insurance company profits 
have been included in the list of choices. 45 percent of firms reported the contribution to be “a lot,” second only 
to higher spending for prescription drugs (66 percent). (Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and 
Educational Trust Employer Health Benefits 2006 Annual Survey, Exhibit 12.3)   35
Indeed, I find this de facto price discrimination is most pronounced in markets with a small 
number of insurance carriers.  Additional analyses reveal employers are less willing to switch 
insurers after they experience positive profit shocks, a phenomenon that affords incumbent 
insurers the opportunity to negotiate larger price increases where competition is scarce.  
Collectively, the results challenge the assumption that U.S. health insurance markets are 
highly competitive.   
   
  The welfare implications of the specific behavior I document are likely to be 
negative.  In a homogeneous product market, if quantity transacted does not increase and 
consumer and producer surplus are equally valued, price discrimination reduces welfare.  In 
the setting I consider, the quantity of insurance consumed is unlikely to have changed much.  
Large firms almost always offer insurance, and takeup by employees in these firms is 
extremely insensitive to changes in the premiums they are charged (Gruber and Washington 
2005).  Of course, this setting deviates from the homogenous setting in many ways and 
theoretically surplus gains from discrimination remain possible (e.g. employees in 
unprofitable firms may benefit more from the reduction in their premiums than employees in 
profitable firms lose from the increases they face).   
 
Of greater interest are the broad welfare implications of market power in the health 
insurance industry, of which price discrimination is but one manifestation.  Although the 
analysis I perform does not lend itself to the quantification of market power, the point 
estimates suggest it is nontrivial.  In markets with 6 or fewer carriers, a 10-percentage-point 
increase in the after-tax return on assets (approximately the standard deviation of this 
measure during the 2001 recession) is followed by a 1.2-percent increase in health insurance 
premiums.   Given operating margins for insurers are generally less than 5 percent, this figure 
is rather impressive.
48   Importantly, in my sample the share of covered employees in markets 
with 6 or fewer carriers increased dramatically over time, from 7 percent in 1998 to 23 
percent in 2005.  Concentration has only increased since.  Thus, the evidence indicates health 
                                                 
48 Citing research by Sanford Bernstein, an investment research firm, The Economist reported that 2003 
operating margins were 5.1 percent, “possibly an all-time high” as of the time of reporting (6/12/2004, p. 71).  
Insurers derive a sizeable share of total profits (which exceed operating margins) via the float: they earn interest 
on premium dollars before they are paid to reimburse claims.     36
insurers are exercising market power in an increasing number of geographic markets.  
Quantifying the degree of market power and assessing its impacts on healthcare outcomes 
and costs is an important agenda for future research. 
 
The most immediate implications of this analysis are twofold.  First, federal and state 
governments may want to carefully assess the degree of competition in the relevant insurance 
markets before expanding the role of the private sector in health-insurance provision.  
Second, proposed consolidations in this industry may warrant greater scrutiny by antitrust 
enforcement agencies than has taken place to date.  In particular, the bargaining strength of 
insurers vis-à-vis employers appears to be especially strong where 6-8 or fewer major 
carriers are present.  The results also suggest analyses of employer switching costs are 
critical inputs for assessments of the competitive effects of combinations in this sector.  
Remedies that reduce switching costs, such as prohibitions on multi-year, exclusive contracts 
between insurers and healthcare providers, may lessen the competitive impact of 
consolidations in concentrated markets.   
 
Finally, research on the extent to which uncompetitive markets are contributing to 
higher healthcare costs – and potentially more important – to slower innovation in healthcare 
management and delivery of care – would help to inform the public debate over healthcare 
reform. 
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Source: Enployee Benefit Research Institute estimates using the Current Population Survey, March 
1998-2006 Supplements. 
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Notes: KFF/HRET growth based on average premiums for a family of four, as reported by survey participants.  
“FI” denotes fully-insured plans, while “SI” denotes self-insured plans.  “Premiums” for SI plans reflect 
employers’ estimates of the cost of coverage.  LEHID figures are based on average premiums per covered 
employee, weighted to reflect the number of covered employees in each plan.   41
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Source: KFF/HRET Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits, authors’ tabulations of LEHID 
Notes: KFF/HRET “Large” Firms have more than 5,000 employees   42




Notes:  Data reflects averages across the period 1998-2005.  Canyons and other inhabitable areas are outlined in 
gray.   43
 






































Source: Author’s tabulations, LEHID-FI sample.  The number of markets is 108 (1998) 113 
(2001) and 76 (2005). 
   44
 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics, LEHID FI-Compustat Sample 
          
    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
             
Premium  ($)  3686 3964 4172 4670 5445 5959 6808 7222 
  1016  923  957  1104 1378 1450 1885 2124 
Enrollment (# employees)  170  174 167 189 191 170 182 203 
  487 491 416 535 516 387 553 616 
Lagged  profit  margin  0.050 0.054 0.059 0.061 0.061 0.028 0.028 0.043 
  0.036 0.041 0.052 0.050 0.060 0.114 0.102 0.051 
Demographic  factor  2.28 2.26 2.21 2.25 2.29 2.28 2.41 2.36 
  0.43 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.43 
Plan  design  1.12 1.13 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.07 
  0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06 
P l a n   t y p e           
HMO  88.9% 91.8% 93.2% 92.0% 91.0% 93.5% 91.1% 92.1% 
Indemnity  2.2% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 1.4% 0.0% 1.0% 0.2% 
POS  6.9% 6.6% 4.6% 4.9% 2.7% 3.7% 3.6% 4.8% 
PPO  2.0% 1.4% 2.2% 3.1% 4.9% 2.8% 4.3% 2.8% 
          
Unemployment  Rate  0.044 0.041 0.039 0.047 0.058 0.060 0.055 0.051 
  0.016 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 
AAPCC  ($)  5299 5213 5548 6017 6541 6859 7302 7744 
  923  885  966  1032 1155 1168 1146 1216 
          
Number  of  employers  125 136 129 149 156 184 135 137 
Number  of  markets  108 117 109 113 110 101  83  76 
Number  of  Observations  7016 8320 6870 7306 6864 6201 4041 3599 
          
          
Notes: All statistics are unweighted. The unit of observation is the employer-market-carrier-plan type-year. Standard deviations in italics. 
Premiums are reported in nominal dollars.  Profit margin = after-tax return on assets and is lagged two years.  Demographic factor reflects 
age, gender, and family size for enrollees.  Plan design measures the generosity of benefits.  Both are constructed by the data source and 
exact formulae are not available.  The unemployment rate and Average Adjusted Per Capita Cost (AAPCC) per Medicare beneficiary are 
reported at the county-year level by BLS and CMS, respectively, and matched to the market-year as described in the text. 
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Table 2. The Relationship between Employer Profits and Health Insurance Premiums 
                
  Dependent variable=ln(annual premium); N=50,217 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged Profits  0.024***
       
0.026***
      
0.043***     0.052*** 
    
0.043*** 
      
0.051*** 0.030**  0.040*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Family Size  0.317***
       
0.317***
        
0.297*** 
       
0.297*** 
     
0.297*** 
     
0.297*** 
     
0.299***
     
0.298***
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Plan Design    
       
0.362***   
     
0.411***    
     
0.413***    
        
0.451*** 
     (0.024)     (0.032)     (0.032)     (0.032) 
          
Plan Fixed Effects                      N  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Market-Year  Covariates          
Unemployment Rate 
      





Ln(Average Medicare Costs) 
      
  0.073** 
(0.033) 
   0.084*** 
(0.032) 
N/A N/A 
Market-Year Interactions                   Y  Y 
            
                
 * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01               
Notes:  Models are estimated using the LEHID FI-Compustat Sample.  The unit of observation is the employer-market-carrier-plan type-year.  Specifications 
correspond to equation (1) in the text, and are estimated by FGLS to account for serial correlation of errors among observations of the same employer-market-
carrier-plan type (or “plan”).    All specifications include fixed effects for employer, market, carrier, plan type, year, plan type-year, and employer-market.      46
Table 3. The Relationship between Employer Profits and Health Insurance 
Premiums, By Market Structure of the Insurance Sector 
 
        
   Dependent variable=ln(annual premium); N=50,217 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Profits*      
<=4  carriers  0.151***  0.148** 0.145** 0.168** 
  (0.058) (0.072) (0.072) (0.075) 
5-6  carriers  0.047*  0.092** 0.092** 0.060 
  (0.027) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
7-8  carriers  0.034*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.042** 
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
9-10  carriers  0.013** 0.043** 0.042** 0.034* 
  (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
>10  carriers  0.011 0.035 0.034 0.027 
  (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Demographic  Factor  0.317*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.298*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Plan  Design  0.363*** 0.413*** 0.415*** 0.451*** 
  (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
      
Plan Fixed Effects  N  Y  Y  Y 






Average Medicare Costs 
  
  0.078** 
(0.033) 
N/A 
Market-Year Interactions  N  N  N  Y 
p-values from H0: γ1, 1 = γ1,5 H1: γ1, 1 > γ1,5        .01  .07  .07  .04 
        
 * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01     
Notes:  Models are estimated using the LEHID FI-Compustat Sample.  The unit of observation is the 
employer-market-carrier-plan type-year.  Specifications correspond to equation (2) in the text, and are 
estimated by FGLS to account for serial correlation of errors among observations of the same employer-
market-carrier-plan type (or “plan”).    All specifications include fixed effects for employer, market, carrier, 
plan type, year, number of carrier category, plan type-year, and employer-market.    
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Table 4. The Relationship between Employer Profits and Health Insurance 
Premiums, By Market Structure of the Insurance Sector 
Controlling for Differences in Markup for Plan Design 
        
   Dependent variable=ln(annual premium); N=50,217 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Profits*      
<=4  carriers  0.154***  0.143** 0.141** 0.162** 
  (0.058) (0.072) (0.072) (0.075) 
5-6  carriers  0.046*  0.091** 0.092** 0.059 
  (0.027) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
7-8  carriers  0.034*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.041** 
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
9-10  carriers  0.013** 0.043** 0.042** 0.034* 
  (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
>10  carriers  0.011 0.035 0.034 0.027 
  (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Plan  Design*      
<=4  carriers  0.429*** 0.328*** 0.333*** 0.280** 
  (0.071) (0.092) (0.092) (0.109) 
5-6  carriers  0.422*** 0.419*** 0.420*** 0.448*** 
  (0.048) (0.055) (0.055) (0.061) 
7-8  carriers  0.380*** 0.401*** 0.405*** 0.436*** 
  (0.034) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) 
9-10  carriers  0.323*** 0.435*** 0.434*** 0.482*** 
  (0.034) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
>10  carriers  0.358*** 0.415*** 0.417*** 0.462*** 
  (0.039) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) 
Demographic  Factor  0.317*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.299*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Plan Fixed Effects  N  Y  Y  Y 






Average Medicare Costs 
  
  0.077** 
(0.033) 
N/A 
Market-Year Interactions  N  N  N  Y 
p-values from H0: γ1, 1 = γ1,5 H1: γ1, 1 > γ1,5        .01  .07  .08  .04 
        
 * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01     
Notes:  Models are estimated using the LEHID FI-Compustat Sample.  The unit of observation is the 
employer-market-carrier-plan type-year.  Specifications correspond to equation (2) in the text, and are 
estimated by FGLS to account for serial correlation of errors among observations of the same employer-
market-carrier-plan type (or “plan”).    All specifications include fixed effects for employer, market, carrier, 
plan type, year, number of carrier category, plan type-year, and employer-market.    
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Table 5.  Robustness Check:  
First Differences Specifications 
        
   Dependent variable=Δ ln(annual premium); N =25,514 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Lagged Profits 
 
0.027***  0.022**     
 (0.010)  (0.010)     
*I(<=4 carriers)       0.125*** 
 
0.152***
     (0.044)  (0.057) 
*I(5-6 carriers)      0.087***  0.012 
     (0.024)  (0.029) 
*I(7-8 carriers)      0.036***  0.030** 
     (0.013)  (0.013) 
*I(9-10 carriers)      0.009  0.008 
     (0.013)  (0.015) 
*I(>10 carriers)       0.014  0.017 
     (0.015)  (0.017) 
        
Demographic Factor  0.289*** 0.290***  0.289***  0.290***
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.  004) 
Plan Design  0.342*** 0.370***  0.342***  0.382***
 (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Market-Year Interactions  N  Y  N  Y 
        
 * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01     
Notes:  Specifications correspond to equation (3) in the text.  Models are estimated using the LEHID FI-
Compustat Sample.  The unit of observation is the employer-market-carrier-plan type. All specifications 
include year and plan type-year fixed effects. Specifications (3) and (4) also include fixed effects for the 
number of carrier categories.  Robust standard errors, clustered by employer-market-carrier-plan type, are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics (Switching Analysis) 
          
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005   
FI and SI combined           
           
Carrierswitch  42% 45% 37% 37% 32% 33% 25%   
Planswitch  51% 53% 50% 47% 41% 44% 34%   
Lagged  profits  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04   
  0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.06   
           
Number  of  employers  142 138 159 168 213 162 166   
Number  of  markets  136 136 137 137 137 137 137   
Number  of  observations 5787 6009 5927 7213 8235 6741 6634   
FI only          
           
Carrierswitch  55% 56% 49% 48% 41% 36% 32%   
Planswitch  64% 64% 58% 59% 50% 47% 41%   
Lagged  profits  0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04   
  0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.05   
           
Number  of  employers  136 129 149 156 184 135 137   
Number  of  markets  117 109 113 110 101  83  76   
Number  of  observations 3051 3115 2860 3093 2989 1929 1706   
           
           
Notes: All statistics are unweighted. The unit of observation is the employer-market-year.  Standard deviations in italics   50
Table 7. Switching Analysis 
              
Dependent Variable  carrierswitch planswitch carrierswitch planswitch  carrierswitch planswitch carrierswitch  planswitch 
FI + SI Combined (N=46,546)                  
                   
Lagged Profits      -0.580***      -0.516***      -0.584***      -0.523***      -0.406***      -0.234***     -0.340***   -0.162** 
  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.057)  (0.059) (0.063)  (0.064) 
Market-Year FEs  N  N  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y 
Employer FEs  N  N  N N Y  Y  N/A  N/A 
Employer-Market FEs  N  N  N N N  N Y  Y 
FI Sample (N=18,743)                   
                   
Lagged Profits      -0.528***      -0.423***      -0.534***      -0.432***      -0.405***     -0.207**      -0.418***     -0.167 
  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)  (0.054) (0.104)  (0.103) 
Market-Year FEs  N  N  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y 
Employer FEs  N  N  N N Y  Y  N/A  N/A 
Employer-Market FEs  N  N  N N N  N Y  Y 
              
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01             
Notes: Specifications correspond to equation (4) in the text.  All models include year fixed effects.  The unit of observation is the employer-market-year.   51
Table 8.  Switching Analysis, by Type of Switch 
 
Carrier  Changes     
  Add   Drop  Add and Drop 
     
Lagged Profits       .236***        .038***        .062*** 
  (.060) (.008) (.012) 
     
Sample  Probability  .090 .105 .160 
     
Predicted Probability with 
10% Lagged Profit Shock 
.085 .083 .133 
     
     
Plan  Changes     
  Add   Drop  Add and Drop 
     
Lagged Profits       .335***        .063***        .094*** 
  (.085) (.013) (.016) 
     
Sample  Probability  .101 .108 .244 
     
Predicted Probability with 
10% Lagged Profit Shock 
.099 .090 .212 
     
 
 * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes: Entries correspond to relative risk ratios (standard errors) from a multinomial logit model estimated using the carrier 
change outcome (top panel) and plan change outcome (bottom panel) on the combined FI& SI sample (N=46,546).  Both 
models include year fixed effects.  52
 
Table 9. Switching Analysis, By Market Structure of the Insurance Sector 
 
        
   Dependent variable=carrierswitch; (N=46,546) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Profits*      
<=4 carriers  -0.187*  -0.179*  -0.085    0.128 
  (0.104) (0.105) (0.110) (0.170) 
5-6  carriers  -0.644*** -0.623*** -0.373*** -0.082 
  (0.083) (0.084) (0.094) (0.126) 
7-8  carriers  -0.584*** -0.583*** -0.448*** -0.251*** 
  (0.055) (0.056) (0.070) (0.088) 
9-10  carriers  -0.586*** -0.594*** -0.414*** -0.499*** 
  (0.067) (0.068) (0.081) (0.103) 
>10  carriers  -0.737*** -0.750*** -0.521*** -0.760*** 
  (0.075) (0.076) (0.088) (0.119) 
      
Market-Year FEs  N Y Y Y 
Employer FEs  N N Y  N/A 
Employer-Market FEs  N N N Y 
       
 * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01     
Notes:  Models are estimated using the FI & SI combined sample.  All specifications include fixed effects for 
years and number of carrier categories.  The unit of observation is the employer-market-year. 
.   
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Appendix Table 1.  Number of Employers in 
LEHID Data, 1998-2005 
      
   Total 
At least 1 
FI plan 
At least 1 
SI Plan 
% At 
least 1 FI 
Plan 
1998 194 181 180 93% 
1999 205 197 193 96% 
2000 199 185 191 93% 
2001 242 226 233 93% 
2002 255 226 248 89% 
2003 330 274 315 83% 
2004 246 194 238 79% 
2005 262 203 257 77% 
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Appendix A. Substitution between Full and Self-Insurance 
 
To examine the effect of profit shocks on substitution between full and self-insurance, I 
begin with the entire sample of healthplans in the market-years included in the LEHID-FI 
sample.  I drop employer-markets that exclusively self-insure in all years, as these employer-
markets never appear in the LEHID-FI sample.  I also restrict the sample to employer-years 
with data on lagged profits.  I collapse the data to the employer-market-year level, creating 
employee-weighted averages for all measures.  Thus, “premium” is now the average 
expected outlay per enrollee (whether in an FI or SI plan).  I also construct measures such as 
the number of plans offered, the percent of enrollees in self-insured plans, and the percent of 
enrollees in each plan type.  The final sample contains 38,290 observations from 409 unique 
employers.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A1 below. 
 
Table A1.  Descriptive Statistics, Employer-Market-Year Sample  
          
    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Premium  ($)  3932 4079 4385 4854 5573 6301 6952 7463 
  973 914 944 993  1174  1202  1546  1684 
Enrollment (# employees)  616  546 511 583 556 528 554 570 
  1865 1620 1458 1792 1726 1325 1391 1439 
Lagged  profit  margin  0.050 0.053 0.059 0.063 0.060 0.030 0.028 0.039 
  0.038 0.045 0.054 0.051 0.057 0.111 0.105 0.061 
Demographic  factor  2.32 2.28 2.24 2.26 2.31 2.30 2.36 2.35 
  0.43 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 
Plan  design  1.07 1.07 1.05 1.07 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.00 
  0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 
Plan  Composition           
% in self-insured plans  45.7%  44.9%  48.7%  52.9%  55.0%  61.7%  65.1%  69.6% 
%  offering  self-insured  plan  76.2% 83.4% 84.6% 85.3% 84.2% 88.4% 87.6% 91.7% 
#  Fully-insured  plans  1.66 1.65 1.49 1.39 1.27 1.08 1.00 0.90 
#  Self-insured  plans  1.19 1.26 1.33 1.38 1.41 1.57 1.62 1.64 
%  HMO  47.5% 51.8% 50.7% 47.8% 47.6% 44.8%  43%  50.5% 
%  Indemnity  14.5%  12.0%  8.2% 5.7% 4.9% 3.1% 2.6% 1.8.% 
%  POS  21.6% 16.7% 19.1% 17.7% 13.2% 12.1% 13.4% 11.2% 
%  PPO  16.4% 19.5% 22.0% 28.8% 34.3% 40.0% 41.0% 46.5% 
 
Number  of  employers  128 137 132 151 160 193 146 150 
Number  of  markets  108 117 109 113 110 101  83  76 
Number  of  Observations  4222 5029 4624 5255 5384 5718 4047 4011 
Notes: Standard deviations in italics.   55
 
I begin by estimating the following specifications (results in Table A2): 
 
emt t m em t t e emt   margin   profit insured -  self %       (A1) ε + φ + ς + τ + γ + α = − ] [ 2 , 1  
and 




t e m NC emt
 
NC margin   profit NC insured -  self %       (A2)
ε + φ + ς + τ +









2 , , 1  
 
The estimate of  1 γ is negative and marginally significant: firms with profit shocks rely less on 
self-insured plans.  Decomposing this by the market structure of FI carriers reveals no steady 
pattern or significant differences across different market types.  Thus, in spite of the price 
increases profitable firms face, they are less likely to switch toward self-insurance than are 
less profitable firms, ceteris paribus.  This result is not surprising given the switching 
analysis, which illustrates the reluctance of profitable firms to make changes to their plan 
portfolios.  Next, I estimate specifications using the log of “premium” (i.e. expected outlay 
per enrollee) as the dependent variable (results in Table A3): 
 





t emt 3 emt 2 2 t e, 1 emt
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  τ design   plan γ cs demographi γ margin   profit γ α ) premium" ln("       (A3)
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Given the level of aggregation, this specification cannot include as rich a set of covariates as  
that included in the specifications using plan-year data (e.g. there are no controls for the 
carriers used, and the plan design measure is an average across plan types).  However, the 
similarity of the coefficient estimates for plan design and demographic factor is reassuring.  
On average, the relationship between profit shocks and premiums is positive and statistically 
insignificant, but this aggregate coefficient belies significant associations in concentrated   56
markets.  The magnitudes are quite similar to those obtained using only the fully-insured 
sample.  Given fully-insured plans account for less than half of enrollment in the typical 
employer-market-year, and self-insured plans did not exhibit similar patterns of premium 
increases in the falsification exercise, it would seem the coefficient magnitudes should be 
smaller.  However, a direct comparison cannot be made because the effective weighting 
scheme in the two analyses is quite different.  In the main analysis, each fully-insured plan-
year counts equally; in this supplemental analysis, each employer-market-year (some of 
which do not even appear in the main analysis) count equally.  The conclusion that emerges 
from these results is that profitable employers do end up paying more for health insurance for 
the average enrollee in concentrated insurance markets, even once expected outlays from 
self-insured enrollees are incorporated into the calculation. 
 
Table A2.  Effect of Profits on Self-Insurance Rate  
 
        
   Dependent variable=% self-insured; N =38,290 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Profits  -0.058*  -0.057*     
 (0.031)  (0.030)     
*I(<=4 carriers)      -0.096   0.021 
     (0.172)  (0.175) 
*I(5-6 carriers)      -0.104  -0.080 
     (0.074)  (0.075) 
*I(7-8 carriers)      -0.074*  -0.065 
     (0.042)  (0.042) 
*I(9-10 carriers)      -0.019  -0.009 
     (0.048)  (0.048) 
*I(>10 carriers)      -0.056  -0.096* 
     (0.055)  (0.056) 
      
Market-Year Interactions  N  Y  N  Y 
        
 * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01     
Notes:  The unit of observation is the employer-market-year.  Specifications correspond to equations (A1) and 
(A2), and are estimated by FGLS to account for serial correlation of errors among observations from the same 
employer-market.   
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Table A3. The Relationship between Employer Profits and Expected Health 
Insurance Outlays, By Market Structure of the Insurance Sector 
 
        
   Dependent var=ln(expected outlays); N=38,290
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 
Lagged Profits  0.016   0.014     
 (0.013)  (0.013)     
*I(<=4 carriers)      0.152**  0.134** 
     (0.062)  (0.064) 
*I(5-6 carriers)      0.072**  0.068** 
     (0.030)  (0.031) 
*I(7-8 carriers)      0.025  0.024 
     (0.017)  (0.017) 
*I(9-10 carriers)      0.021  0.023 
     (0.019)  (0.019) 
*I(>10 carriers)      -0.040*  -0.045** 
     (0.022)  (0.022) 
















Market-Year Interactions  N  Y  N  Y 
 
p-values from H0: γ1, 1 = γ1,5 H1: γ1, 1 > γ1,5 N/A N/A  .00  .00 
        
 * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01     
Notes:  The unit of observation is the employer-market-year.  Specifications correspond to equations (A3)  and (A4) 
and are estimated by FGLS to account for serial correlation of errors among observations from the same employer-
market.  
 